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Abstract Scenarios have become a powerful tool in
integrated assessment and policy analysis for climate
change. Socio-economic and climate scenarios are often
combined to assess climate change impacts and vulnera-
bilities across different sectors and to inform risk man-
agement strategies. Such combinations of scenarios can
also play an important role in enabling the interaction
between experts and other stakeholders, framing issues and
providing a means for making explicit and dealing with
uncertainties. Drawing on experience with the application
of scenarios to climate change assessments in recent Dutch
research, the paper argues that scenario approaches need to
be matched to the frames of stakeholders who are situated
in specific decision contexts. Differentiated approaches
(top-down, bottom-up and interactive) are needed to
address the different frames and decision-making contexts
of stakeholders. A framework is proposed to map scenarios
and decision contexts onto two dimensions: the spatial
scale of the context and the starting point of approach used
in scenario development (top-down, bottom-up or incident-
driven). Future climate and socio-economic scenario
development will be shaped by the need to become better
aligned with multiple interacting uncertainties salient to
stakeholders.
Keywords Climate change  Climate scenarios 
Socio-economic scenarios  Framing  Uncertainty 
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Introduction
Projections of future climates and societies play a funda-
mental role in public and policy debates about climate
change. Major efforts have been made, in the context of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by
national agencies and through scientific research to develop
realisations of future climates and to link these to assess-
ments of future risks to social systems and ecosystems
(Nakicenovic et al. 2000; Hulme et al. 2002; van den Hurk
et al. 2006; Moss et al. 2010; Heinrichs et al. 2010; IPCC
2012a). Scenario approaches have stood at the heart of
projections of both climate and socio-economic futures
because they are a powerful way of representing uncer-
tainties in complex, dynamic systems. An important ana-
lytical challenge in combining climate scenarios and socio-
economic scenarios is that they each deal with different
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forms of uncertainty (Berkhout et al. 2002; van Vuuren
et al. 2011). While climate scenarios are concerned pri-
marily with uncertainties in physical and biogeochemical
systems, socio-economic scenarios are concerned with
uncertainties in economic, social, political and cultural
systems in which reflexivity and innovation are funda-
mental features.
Early assessments of climatic changes and the associ-
ated risks for ecosystems and economic activities were
regional and global in scope (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994;
Arnell 1998). A ‘top-down’ approach was used in the
development of climate and socio-economic scenarios to
represent and analyse climate and social change and how
these together influenced the vulnerability of social and
ecological systems. This matched the framing of climate
change as a global environmental change problem. Over
time, the social and spatial specificity of the changes in
climate and the risks1 they pose for ecological and societal
systems have become more evident. And this has produced
a growing interest in projections at regional and national
scales (Gleick 1987; Kwadijk 1993), with growing efforts
to ‘tailor’ outputs from scenarios to specific user needs
(Van den Hurk et al. 2013a). Increasingly, climate change,
vulnerability and resilience have been viewed from the
‘bottom-up’, taking this regional or sector-specific vul-
nerability and resilience as a starting point for scenario
development.
The application of climate and socio-economic scenar-
ios to the specific decision contexts of practitioner and
decision-makers has generated new questions. A key issue
is the uncertainty in weather and climate projections at
shorter time scales and more specific spatial scales (e.g.
Haasnoot and Middelkoop 2012; Maslin and Austin 2012).
Even for quite fundamental parameters, such as annual
mean precipitation, climate models may give a wide range
of results for certain regions (Deque et al. 2007). The
mismatch between the current capacity to make reliable
predictions of weather and climate, and users’ needs for
information is illustrated in Fig. 1. Moreover, finding a ‘fit’
between the life-world of decision-makers and the outputs
of scenario-based assessments remains a major challenge.
There appears often to be a mismatch between model and
scenario outputs, and the needs of decision-makers for
information about uncertainties. Finally, weather and cli-
mate variability may interact in complex ways with social
and institutional factors to generate hazards or opportuni-
ties for specific social actors or under specific conditions.
Important hazards and risks are frequently the outcome of
event sequences that may be hard to analyse or generalise.
Given these difficulties, there has been a growing
demand for more bottom-up, incident-driven or interactive
scenario approaches, which start from the decision context
of the stakeholder, rather than with aggregated represen-
tations of climatic or social and economic conditions. At
the same time, the greater emphasis on social, spatial and
temporal specificity in scenario use has produced a coun-
tervailing demand for more standardised approaches to
enable comparison and learning across different cases.
Balancing these conflicting priorities has generated new
research needs and methods.
In this paper, we argue that a range of scenario
approaches are available to address different decision-
making contexts in government, business, civil society
and by citizens. While there are decision contexts for
which conventional top-down approaches are appropriate,
there are other contexts that are more local, where
weather variability is a major source of risk and where
multiple factors interact in generating vulnerabilities.
There are still other intermediate cases, typically at the
national or regional scale, for which a combination of top-
down and bottom-up approaches is appropriate. The needs
of decision-makers in these cases are not well served by
conventional approaches. We argue that ‘interactive’
scenario methods are needed for these mid-range
assessments.
In this paper, we develop a typology of scenario
approaches and illustrate these for a number of examples
covering different context frames, perceptions of uncer-
tainty, scales and decision contexts. Scenarios can be
viewed as an instrument for framing uncertainties salient to
decision-makers, allowing them to integrate knowledge
about climate variability and change into their own deci-
sion context. Unravelling the flexibility and context
dependency of frames is difficult, because they can be
Fig. 1 Predictability of weather and climate models across spatial
and temporal scales: a mismatch between model skill and user needs.
‘Skill’ relates to the statistical quality of predictions made by weather
and climate models (Source ICPO 2010)
1 See http://ace.geocat.net/glossary#linkRisk for a definition of vul-
nerability and risks, compiled by the European Climate Adaptation
Platform.
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expressed by a variety of representations (e.g. how a
problem is stated, who is expected to make a statement
about it, what questions appear relevant and what range of
answers might be appropriate). For our purpose, we have
chosen to look across a range of contexts with the aim of
illustrating contrasting patterns of reasoning, such as top-
down as compared with bottom-up approaches. We stress
the practical use of scenarios and draw on examples
including the new IPCC Representative Concentration
Pathways (RCP) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSP), the Dutch Climate Scenarios, Dutch Delta Scenar-
ios, a study on wind climatology for the Dutch offshore
wind industry, a study of compound events related to
flooding in North Netherlands, the Revised Hydrological
Year and Adaptation Tipping Points associated with the
Thames 2100 study.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section,
we outline how actor frames are related to decision-making
contexts. We then describe ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and
‘interactive’ (generally a combination of bottom-up and
top-down) approaches to developing scenarios, which
frame uncertainties about future climate, and the resilience
and vulnerability of biophysical and social systems. We
then argue that different scenario approaches are appro-
priate to different decision-making contexts and conclude
with a framework for mapping scenario approaches to
decision contexts. The examples used for illustration will
be revisited in the final discussion section, specifically
comparing the scenario approaches and the match to the
specific decision contexts.
Framing and decision contexts
Developing scenarios that generate information useful to
different social actors requires a clear understanding of
their frames and decision-making contexts. Frames are
mental knowledge structures that capture the typical fea-
tures of a situation or event sequence, defining a set of
relevant concepts and problems, and thereby shaping
knowledge and experience (Barsalou 1992; Bednarek
2005). The way in which a problem is framed (i.e. the
problem frame) accentuates particular highlights, oppor-
tunities, vulnerabilities, uncertainties and attention points
that can either help or hinder sense-making about a prob-
lem and the search for a solution. In any social situation,
frames are not just personal mindsets, but also cultural
structures that enable individuals to take shared or oppos-
ing political and philosophical positions (Scho¨n and Rein
1994). As a result, the use of scenarios in decision-making
on climate change should take into account that a problem
framing is often constrained by interests and experiences of
actors in the decision-making context,2 such as their
willingness to take risks, experience in dealing with
uncertainty and other social and cultural factors.
Scenarios can be viewed as frames enabling projections
of future climate and its impacts to be shared and debated
(de Boer et al. 2010). Without explicit frames, structured
exchange of evidence and argument is difficult, and it will
be hard to motivate action. Scenarios work to frame the
relationship between science and decision-making by
adapting formalised knowledge to the decision context and
by assisting the search for responses that are practicable for
the decision-makers. However, the gap between science
and committed action by decision-makers is often felt to be
large. It is a common fate of decision tools that first-best
options are not always chosen. We can learn from ‘natu-
ralistic decision-making’ (Lipshitz et al. 2001) that the
quality of a decision depends not only on its internal logic
or consistency, but also on the commitments it generates
among decision-makers to act in line with the outcomes.
Our observations indicate that committed action is easier to
generate when the starting point is not a top-down frame,
but a more familiar event-based frame, evoked, for
instance, by extreme weather that clearly indicates how
decision-makers’ options are affected by weather
variability.
In their role as decision support tools, scenarios have to
compete with other ways in which decision-makers may
reason about the future. According to Rumelhart (1989),
there are three common processes for reasoning about
novel situations:
Reasoning by similarity: a problem is solved by
seeing the current situation as similar to a previous
one in which the solution is known. In this category
fall intuition, reasoning by example or experience,
generalization and analogical reasoning.
Reasoning by simulation: a problem is solved by
imagining the consequence of an action and making
explicit the knowledge that is implicit in our ability to
imagine an event. This category includes story-
building to mentally simulate the events leading up to
a certain ending.
Formal reasoning: a formal symbolic system, such as
logic or mathematics, is employed in the solution of a
problem. Examples are formal mathematical models
of biophysical or social systems, including climate
scenarios.
2 By decision context, we mean the institutional setting of a decision-
making process, including the actors who are involved in that process.
A commission of experts developing a new national strategy for flood
risk management over the next 50 years, such as the Dutch Delta
Commission (2007–2008), represents a different decision context than
a farmer planning what crops to grow in the coming season.
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Reasoning by similarity and by simulation are important
ways in which skilled decision-makers can build on their
experience to make decisions. Formal approaches are
extensions of these two ways of reasoning. For instance,
influence inference diagrams and computer simulation
models build upon mental simulation of processes in the
real world by using mathematics and formal analysis.
However, depending on the decision context, there may be a
tension between naturalistic decision-making (using intui-
tion or simulation) and formalised decision-making (using
formal reasoning). According to Lipshitz et al. (2001), a
formalised approach is more likely to be used with prob-
lems that are highly combinatorial, in situations where
justifications are required, and in cases where the views of
different stakeholders have to be taken into account. This
assumes that formalised approaches are widely held to be
valid. However, while the integration of formal climate
models with economic models has come to be seen as valid
in assessments of the costs and benefits of efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions (Nordhaus and Yang 1993; Tol
2009; Nordhaus 2010), such validity has not yet been
demonstrated for assessments based on the integration of
climate models with models that represent impacts, adap-
tation and vulnerability (IAV) to climate change (Patt et al.
2010). This difference in relative status may also partly
explain their reduced salience for decision-makers.
Conventional top-down scenarios are based on formal
reasoning and have been oriented to complex, multi-
stakeholder, broad-scale and long-term decision contexts,
such as the IPCC and international climate policy. Similar
approaches have been used in IAV assessments at both
global and local levels. But many decision contexts related
to climate risk, vulnerability and adaptation are related to
local and short-term problems involving a specific com-
munity of actors. There has therefore been a trend towards
scenario approaches which include more naturalistic ele-
ments. Such bottom-up scenarios can also create and
maintain commitment by providing a means of reasoning
by similarity or by simulation. This shift may involve a
change of frames, replacing a probabilistic view by an
intuitive deterministic view; or an outside view by an
inside view. That is, instead of looking at a system, such as
a dike ring, from the outside, as one out of many dike rings,
one may look at the system from within, as an inhabitant,
simulating what might happen in a particular location on
the basis of local knowledge and values. Such an insider’s
view of the system would start from the life-world of the
inhabitant.3
In many decision-making contexts, a combination of the
formal top-down and naturalistic bottom-up approaches
may be drawn on. Relying solely on formal scenarios
introduces the risk of overlooking relevant parts of the
ranges explored and may lead to over-generalisation. A
focus on naturalistic approaches allows inclusion of a wide
range of locally relevant aspects into the decision process,
but introduces the risk of missing the bigger picture and a
selective reading of relevant information. Appropriate
combinations of these two approaches provide the balance
for decision-makers, provided that they understand that
inside and outside views draw on different sources of
knowledge and are directed at different contexts of
decision.
Top-down, interactive and bottom-up scenario
approaches
Complex systems such as the climate or a society are not
predictable in a conventional sense. This problem becomes
even more acute when climate and society are seen as
interacting systems. Where the decision context relates to
social, spatial and temporal scales not usefully served by
deterministic or probabilistic predictability, scenario
approaches are typically used. Conventionally, climate
scenarios often assume a fundamental driver of future
conditions to obtain a certain value (a ‘what if?’ condition),
such as global fossil fuel consumption and the climate
system response to this by the end of the twenty-first
century. For the well-known IPCC scenarios (IPCC 2007),
an extended hierarchy of assumptions and modelling tools
is used to depict future climatic conditions in response to a
chain of interacting processes: assuming given socio-eco-
nomic and technological developments, global greenhouse
gas emissions are estimated to have a value labelled as W,
to which the climate system responds within a range X,
which is downscaled to the regional level to estimate a
local climate response Y, which translates into impacts on
the regional socio-economic or natural system within
another range Z. We view this approach as a top-down
approach to scenario projection. The breadth of the range
of responses (often labelled as uncertainties) tends to
increase down the scenario chain (Schneider and Ma-
strandrea 2005).
At the global scale, climate variability affected by spa-
tially varying processes and by interactions with sur-
rounding regions is averaged out, but at the regional scale,
this variability is evident. Regional climate change sce-
narios aim to translate global changes to the national or
regional scale (Such as the Dutch Climate Change sce-
narios; KNMI 2006; Van den Hurk et al. 2007, 2013b).
They include an explicit dependence on external steering
3 By life-world, we mean the shared common understandings,
including values, held by and holding together any social group
(Schu¨tz and Luckmann 1973; Habermas 1981). Life-worlds are more
generic than the frames they support.
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variables that span a range of uncertainty originating from
regional boundary conditions. This increased complexity
means that at the regional level, different climate models
produce even stronger differences than at the global scale.
Such climate uncertainties are compounded in assessments
of impacts with the greater variety of social, economic and
governance factors that need to be taken into account at the
regional or national level in order to generate assessments
that engage with the decision contexts and frames of
practitioners and stakeholders. It is beyond the scope (and
ability) of formal analysis to address such complexity of
phenomena and their interactions.
Climate impacts, vulnerability and adaptation choices
can also be framed in the opposite way. A reverse chain of
analysis uses the vulnerabilities or opportunities of relevant
sectors as a starting point (Pielke et al. 2012; Wilby and
Dessai 2010). Examples of this approach include the
Thames Estuary 2100 study (UK Environment Agency
2009), which assessed alternative pathways for adaptation
to uncertain sea-level rise for the Thames Barrier and the
‘adaptation tipping point’ analysis which has been applied
to Dutch water management (Kwadijk et al. 2010). This
bottom-up approach assumes that multiple drivers of risk
and change are salient to the decision context and frames of
practitioners and policy-makers. Climate-related risks are
introduced only where these are relevant to a decision
context. Such approaches start with what is known about
the resilience or vulnerability of a given system, and then
seek to assess the capacity of the system to cope with
climate stresses in the current state, or under alternative
adaptation scenarios.
One advantage of bottom-up approaches is that they
specify the uncertainties and ensure a focus on that fraction
of the uncertainty that is relevant for the decision context
of an identifiable social actor. Such assessments do not
attempt to cover the full range of uncertainties, but con-
centrate on the occurrence of conditions that have a major
impact for a system, region or activity covered by the
assessment. By building scenarios out of the life-worlds of
stakeholders that are well fitted to decision contexts, the
potential for generating commitment to action is also
greater.
Another distinction between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-
up’ approaches is the level of conceptualisation. Top-down
approaches seek to map changes of major drivers of the
climate and of socio-economic systems, and technical
consensus on the choice of these factors provides a gen-
eralised framework for scenarios. From these general
conditions, more specific analyses are then derived. A
bottom-up approach, by contrast, starts with a potentially
impacted system, region, sector or actor for which a range
of specific factors may be significant drivers of risk or
resilience. Such an approach could also include the
exploration of observed or synthetic event sequences gen-
erating extreme or catastrophic risks for the system in
question. These could include combinations of climatic,
and technological and organisational factors. An inventory
of vulnerabilities (or opportunities) and event sequences
represents a potentially large portfolio of individual cases,
for which a general framework is often impracticable. This
complexity of bottom-up, resilience-based assessments is
also a weakness, since such assessments can be research-
intensive, time-consuming and costly. Their results are also
more difficult to compare with each other. It has also been
argued that vulnerability assessments may promise more
than they can deliver (Patt et al. 2010).
While the distinctions between top-down and bottom-up
approaches are important, actors’ decision contexts do not
all fall neatly into such a classification. Across the different
scales and sectors in which climate change information
may be salient to choices and decisions, mid-range cases
exist in which a combination of top-down and bottom-up
approaches will be appropriate. These will include
national- or regional-level decisions with a decadal time
span. Indeed, the most significant public policy interven-
tions in adaptation, related, for instance, to infrastructural
investments related to cities, energy, transport, water and
nature conservation, will be of this type. For these contexts,
we identify a third ‘interactive’ scenario approach as being
appropriate.
Top-down scenario approaches
Global scenarios
For more than two decades, a suite of IPCC emissions and
associated climate scenarios has been applied in research
and climate assessments. The first emissions scenarios in
1990 (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, SRES) were
top-down, non-policy scenarios (IPCC 1990). These sce-
narios were further elaborated with the introduction of
future socio-economic storylines, leading to a new set of
generalised greenhouse gas emission scenarios (Girod et al.
2009; Moss et al. 2010). No consideration was taken of
adaptation and mitigation policies in these socio-economic
scenarios because they were intended as ‘business-as-
usual’ futures against which the costs and benefits of mit-
igation and adaptation strategies were to be measured.
Given that mitigation and adaptation is already taking
place, such scenarios came to be seen as entirely synthetic
and not relevant to many decision contexts.
To include the interactions between socio-economic
change and climate change as they unfold over time, a new
approach was proposed which integrated climate and
socio-economic uncertainty while also framing different
mitigation and adaptation response trajectories into the
Framing climate uncertainty
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future. Four illustrative radiative-forcing trajectories, so-
called Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs),
were defined (corresponding to 490, 650, 850 and
[1,370 ppm CO2 equivalents in 2100; Moss et al. 2010).
The RCPs have been used as inputs for climate models to
provide long-term, global climate change projections. In
addition, a mixture of future impacts, vulnerabilities,
adaptation and mitigation challenges was developed, with
qualitative narratives and quantitative descriptions of
socio-economic and ecosystem reference conditions, called
‘Shared Socioeconomic Pathways’ (SSPs) (Kriegler et al.
2010). The scope of these RCPs and SSPs is global.
Five SSPs have been developed, representing a range of
adaptation and mitigation responses determined by differ-
ent prevailing social, political and economic futures
(Fig. 2). In other words, socio-economic futures are framed
in terms of their consequences for the capacity to mitigate
emissions and the capacity to adapt to the impacts of cli-
mate change, in each case ranging from high to low. This
implies that mitigative and adaptive capacities are to a
large extent independent of each other and that these can
be stated in a generalised way. It also implies a wide set of
possible outcomes at the global level. The combination of
four RCPs and five SSPs yields a two-dimensional matrix
(top right matrix in Fig. 2). This matrix, combining climate
forcings and socioeconomic pathways, can be used to
explore how policies can reduce impacts, or to estimate
costs of action or inaction. The final phase in the new
scenario development is the extension of the RCP-SSP
matrix with climate policy through the development of
Shared Climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs, Kriegler et al.
2010). SPAs characterise climate policies, including car-
bon taxes, energy taxes, emissions trading schemes, R&D
subsidies, norms and regulations.
The new RCP/SSP/SPA scenarios (IPCC scenarios 2.0)
address the problem of framing climate uncertainty differ-
ently to the previous SRES/IPCC climate scenarios (IPCC
scenarios 1.0). The IPCC 1.0 scenarios sought to imagine
future worlds absent any social and political responses to
climate change with a full set of uncertainties for a limited
set of climate and socio-economic factors propagated
through different global and regional models. The IPCC 2.0
scenarios make a simplifying assumption about the range of
forcings that are to be considered (the four standard RCPs)
while framing socio-economic futures only in terms of
whether they generate an emissions reductions response or
an adaptive response. A narrower set of forcings are
therefore considered, while background socio-economic
worlds are represented in very abstract terms as generating
mitigative or adaptive capacities. A challenge in the use of
the 2.0 scenarios may be their conceptual complexity.
Downscaling and regionalising global scenarios
Impacts are experienced by social actors, many of whom
have decision contexts at local scales. Downscaling
Fig. 2 The total scenario
domain, including RCPs, SSPs
and SPAs (policy context)
(compilation of table 1.1 and
Figs. 1.1 and 2.2 in Arnell et al.
2011)
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information from global climate models (Wilby and Wig-
ley 1997) or regionalisation (Christensen et al. 2007) was
an early response to the need for more fine-grained infor-
mation useful to practitioners. Downscaling can be done
using a variety of methods. One methodological distinction
separates statistical from dynamical downscaling. Statisti-
cal downscaling uses observed relations between local
phenomena (e.g. extreme precipitation) and well-resolved
large-scale quantities (e.g. atmospheric circulation) to
interpret global climate model output to the local scale.
Dynamical downscaling uses regional climate model out-
put at higher resolution, fed by the driving global climate
model. Often a mix between the two methods is applied
where observations are used to correct biases in global or
regional CMs. Different methods exist to construct future
climate data sets. The ‘delta method’ combines an
observed reference data set with a climate change signal
from climate model projections, whereas the ‘direct
method’ uses climate model output and corrects this for the
bias in the present-day and future climate conditions with
the help of observations (Leander et al. 2008; Van Pelt
et al. 2012).
Along the chain from global climate to regional down-
scaling, uncertainties are propagated. The downscaling
relies on adding new information at the local scale (phys-
iographic data, local observations, knowledge on local
drivers) that will cause an anomaly relative to the results of
the global climate model. A consensus is emerging that
scenario information deduced from a limited set of model
projections under-samples the possible resolvable range of
changes, and the use of wider ensembles should be pro-
moted. The selection and weighting of these ensemble
members remains an active field of research (Van den Hurk
et al. 2013b).
The Dutch Climate Change scenarios issued by KNMI
in 2006 (KNMI’06) project global climate change infor-
mation to the regional scale of the Netherlands and sur-
rounding regions using a combination of downscaling
techniques: pattern scaling, dynamical modelling, statisti-
cal downscaling and user consultation. The involvement of
stakeholders was necessary to define the set of relevant
climate variables that have a potentially large impact on
societal sectors, and this focus on a limited set of climate
variables can also be interpreted as a downscaling step.
Apart from the general reference scenarios, a number of
specific, tailor-made scenarios were constructed, of which
a few examples are discussed in more detail below.
Interactive scenario approaches
An intermediate form of climate assessment dealing with
strategic, national-scale issues such as flood risk manage-
ment, calls for a combination of downscaling of (top-down)
global climate scenarios and (bottom-up) up-scaling of
national or regional socio-economic scenarios. The Dutch
Delta Scenarios, designed to support the Dutch national
climate adaptation policy, are an illustration of an inter-
action between top-down and bottom-up scenarios
(Bruggeman et al. 2011). The Delta Scenarios combine
climate scenarios for the Netherlands (KNMI’06) with
socio-economic scenarios developed by national planning
agencies WLO (Welvaart en Leefomgeving, welfare and
environment) scenarios (WLO 2006). Two scenario fami-
lies were derived: climate change was framed as either
‘rapid’ or ‘moderate’ (consistent with a global mean tem-
perature rise of 4 and 2 C by 2100), and socio-economic
development characterised as either ‘growth’ or ‘contrac-
tion’ (consistent with population and economic growth or
stagnation) (see Fig. 3). The uncertainty range covered by
the scenarios was deliberately constrained to create a frame
appropriate for engineering and economic modelling con-
nected to the development of a new national flood risk
management and freshwater strategies. This example
shows that methodological limits frequently underpin the
framing of future socio-economic uncertainties in scenario-
based analysis.
To integrate the KNMI and WLO scenarios, several
steps were taken. First, the different target years in the
underlying scenarios had to be made consistent. For this,
the WLO scenarios of 2040 were extrapolated to 2050
assuming unchanged socio-economic outlooks (Brugg-
eman et al. 2011). For 2100, the WLO outlooks were
defined in expert workshops with assumptions about eco-
nomic and population growth as determining factors. Four
indicators—economic growth, population growth, temper-
ature and sea-level rise—were used to define extreme
points for the two target years, 2050 and 2100. These four
scenarios allowed modelling analyses of climate change
impacts for vulnerable regions or sectors, in spite of pre-
senting a partial uncertainty range, both from the per-
spective of climate change or vulnerability analysis.
Practical application of the Delta Scenarios led to improved
insight into the relative importance of climate change and
socio-economic changes for regional development. For
example, an assessment of the accessibility of the Rotter-
dam port area found that uncertainties about the volume of
trade handled by Rotterdam are far more significant than
uncertainties about river flow and sea-level rise (Meijers
et al. 2012).
Bottom-up scenario approaches
Downscaling techniques can also be employed as a bottom-
up approach, to the extent that new and relevant informa-
tion, defined in cooperation with stakeholders, is used to
produce ‘tailored’ regionally specific scenarios. During
Framing climate uncertainty
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tailoring, regionalised data from climate models are adap-
ted to the needs of specific groups of users (Gawith et al.
2009; Swart and Avelar 2011; EUMETNET 2010). User
involvement in scenario development has become more
important for the credibility, legitimacy and salience of
outputs of scenario-driven assessments (Hulme and Dessai
2008). Tailoring requires interaction with stakeholders to
specify the question that is most relevant to the user of the
climate information (What kinds of outputs are relevant?
At what scales is it needed? What are critical elements in
the decision context where climate information plays a
role? Which uncertainties are significant to the decision
context?). Also, the tailoring process allows specification
of alternatives where requested outputs cannot be provided,
and for guidance in the interpretation of information and
uncertainties.
In the Dutch Climate Changes Spatial Planning (CCSP)
programme, tailoring climate information received con-
siderable attention (Bessembinder et al. 2011; see Table 1),
which took the KNMI’06 climate change scenarios for the
Netherlands (Van den Hurk et al. 2007) as a point of
departure. In these scenario tailoring projects, frames of
climate modellers and stakeholders are gradually aligned.
For instance, in a project developing adaptation strategies
with provincial governments, a need was identified for a
‘standard hydrological year’ and guidance on its use
(Bakker et al. 2011). This ‘standard year approach’ was
preferred as it was faster and more flexible than a more
conventional approach using full-scale 30-year model
simulations. However, using a single sample year leads to
rather limited information on changes in extremes and
year-to-year variability (see Fig. 4).
Another example of stakeholder interaction relates to the
wind energy sector. The electricity-power-producing
company was interested in wind energy projections for the
next 5–10 years, where a decline in wind energy yields
over the North Sea during the last decades had caused a
concern about near-term investment opportunities. The
question was whether this decline is a manifestation of
natural climate variability or whether a causal link exists
with anthropogenic climate change. A statistical analysis of
observations and model results (Bakker and van den Hurk
Fig. 3 Dutch Delta Scenarios (Deltacommissie 2008)
Table 1 User needs for climate data (Source Bessembinder et al. 2011)
Wind energy Sewage system Coastal protection
Desired data Wind speed Precipitation extremes Sea-level, wind speed and wind direction
Time resolution Daily–monthly–annual 5–60 min 3-h annual
Desired time horizon 2015–2020 2050–2100 2050–2200
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2012) led to the conclusion that model biases in long-term
persistence of wind speed patterns did not allow a robust
evidence-based answer to this question. A follow-up study
was commissioned by the company, which focused on
explaining wind energy yield trends. Here, it was con-
cluded that trends in large-scale wind patterns were only
partially responsible for the wind energy decline in the
North Sea (Bakker et al. 2012). The information from this
study helped the stakeholder in their trend attribution and
served as underpinning data for future investments in wind
energy.
Adaptation tipping point analysis
The adaptation tipping point (ATP) analysis is a bottom-up
vulnerability analysis, which focuses on tipping points in
local to regional adaptation strategies that threaten current
management or policy objectives. Adaptation is viewed as
a series of steps each responding to a stream of climate-
induced constraints as they emerge through time. The
analysis is framed in terms of management objectives and
adaptation options available to the stakeholder and begins
with an analysis of system vulnerability to climate vari-
ability and change. ATP analysis has been applied to Dutch
water management, with regionalised outputs from climate
projections as external forcing (Kwadijk et al. 2010). They
found a number of ATPs for coastal flooding, river flooding
and freshwater supplies. Such information, including
uncertainties, was used to assess the feasibility, sequencing
and costs of alternative adaptation options available now
and in the future.
A surprising result of the analysis was that a key vul-
nerability of the Dutch water management system to future
climate change may be associated with securing future
freshwater supplies. Kwadijk et al. (2010) found that risks
to freshwater supplies as a result of saline ingress related to
sea-level rise, combined with low river discharge, appeared
to be a risk that deserved as much attention as coastal or
river flooding. Freshwater allocations currently permit a
maximum allowable saline concentration of 250 mg/l.
With a convergence of sea-level rise of 35 cm and low
summer river flow along a key stretch of the Hollandsche
IJssel River, strategically important water inlets would
need to be blocked for considerable periods of time (rising
from 0 to 76 days) as early as 2030, producing conditions
which water managers felt could not be managed with
currently available adaptive measures. A more fundamental
re-design of freshwater supplied may therefore be called
for.
Incident-driven scenarios
Extensions of the bottom-up approach that combine an
assessment of ‘event sequences’ leading to significant
exposure to catastrophic hazards associated with extreme
events can also be envisaged. Extreme events are seen as
representing critical risks and as stimuli for adaptive action
(IPCC 2012b). Rather than seeing such events as an out-
come of exogenous stressors of engineering systems,
extreme events have come to be characterised as an out-
come of interacting physical, institutional, organisational
and cultural factors. The 2005 Katrina disaster in New
Orleans, for instance, was an outcome of a combination of
systematic under-investment in coastal defences, poor
planning and corruption, which was exposed when an
intense tropical cyclone hit the US coast (Congleton 2006).
Whether an event is framed as being extreme or a
disaster also depends on the institutional and cultural
context within which it unfolds. Disasters are situations in
which existing provisions for risk management are excee-
ded and lead to unfamiliar and catastrophic hazards to
people, property or ecosystems. They are typically an
outcome of an accumulation of previously unknown or
unanticipated sequences of circumstances, including
Fig. 4 Actual evaporation
(mm) for Dutch regions with a
30-year simulation (left) and a
simulation based on a ‘standard
year’ (Source Bakker et al.
2009)
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unexpected interactions between different systems. Mod-
elling event sequences leading to catastrophic risks is
inherently difficult because they include unknown
unknowns and because analysts and decision-makers have
bounded rationality and specific frames for considering
risk. If they had been able to conceive of an additional risk
as being substantial, it is likely that this risk would have
been taken into account in risk management strategies, all
things being equal. To expand existing mental models (van
Drunen et al. 2011), bottom-up scenario analysis needs to
engage with complex and interacting chains of factors and
events that could lead to catastrophic hazards.
A good place to start looking for relevant event
sequences is near-disasters. For instance, in January 2012,
a major rainfall event on already saturated soil led to
problems in a northern Netherlands polder area. Surface
water could not be discharged to the nearby North Sea due
to a compounding storm surge. These events (high soil
water content, heavy precipitation, storm surge) were not
exceptional by themselves, but their coincidence in time
and space led to a near-disaster (for similar examples see
Kew et al. 2012). This event led to increased attention to
the simultaneous occurrence of storm surge and heavy
precipitation events. In principle, the degree to which
compound events are causally related should be included in
design criteria for water management infrastructure. A
critical research issue concerns whether changes in climate
conditions can lead to a systematic change of these com-
pounding likelihoods (Leonard et al. 2013).
The scientific analysis needed to support decision-
making in this context is different from traditional scenario
analyses in a number of ways. First, the technical analysis
is defined by the local conditions where region-specific
vulnerability and resilience capacity play a dominant role.
It needs to focus on the combined effects of events that can
lead to major hazards. A clear description of the (physical
and social) mechanisms leading to such event sequences is
not only valuable for understanding possible dynamics or
trends, but helps gain public support for the decision-
making process. A transparent translation of multiple
external weather or climate drivers to local socially framed
impacts is a key element in such analysis.
The simulation of more-realistic representations of the
biophysical aspects of extreme events using a model
framework is improving over time as the realism of
weather and climate models increases, and as they become
increasingly integrated. This can help the framing of events
as being plausible and therefore worth including in risk
management planning (Hazeleger et al. submitted). How-
ever, it remains a difficult task to demonstrate the link
between individual events and event sequences, and a
given global climate change scenario. The individual event
depicts a situation that can be considered to be plausible
within a given climate scenario. But the event may be
consistent with other climate scenarios, since it is a man-
ifestation primarily of natural variability in the climate
system interacting with social factors. In addition, deter-
mination of the typical return time of the event sequence
(its ‘rarity’) is difficult to establish because of the large
computer resources needed to generate adequate statistics.
Thus, although an extreme event or event sequence is
considered to be relevant from a vulnerability point of
view, its link to top-down formulated scenarios and its
likelihood of occurrence may be difficult to establish.
A focus on ‘future weather’ and extreme event
sequences marks a significant change in the framing of
both climate and socio-economic uncertainties in climate
vulnerability assessments. First, climate variability feeding
specific local vulnerabilities has become the focus of
analysis. Second, the interaction between climate and
socio-economic drivers in event sequences provides a way
of making vulnerabilities more tangible for stakeholders.
Third, the definition of potential event sequences is done in
a process of co-learning with stakeholders; a process in
which the frames of modellers and stakeholders can be
further aligned.
Discussion: frames, decision contexts and scenario
approaches
The diversification of scenario approaches for climate
assessments is a response to the diversity of frames that
exist among stakeholders situated in the highly diverse
decision contexts. We have argued that a useful way of
differentiating between scenario approaches (top-down,
interactive or bottom-up) is to stratify them according to
the scope and dynamics of decision contexts they serve
(see Fig. 5). To support effectively the process of sense-
making, understanding and learning, scenarios need to
match with the frames of the stakeholder using the results.
Frames are knowledge structures through which social
actors organise and make sense of their life-worlds, cre-
ating the context for them to reason about climate change,
and climate change-induced vulnerabilities and risks.
Fundamental to this is a need to consider uncertainties,
now and in the future. To do this, actors reason by simi-
larity and by simulation. They draw on specific sources of
tacit and codified knowledge, are situated within specific
institutional contexts and relationships and are enacted
through particular organisational routines. Intrinsic to
decision contexts is also a set of assumptions or ‘givens’
that actors share and which define and stabilise their life-
world. For some decision contexts, information needs will
be local and fast, while others will be extensive and
dominated by slow variables. Each decision context
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anticipates a degree of uncertainty and variability in
internal and external conditions affecting the decision.
While there will be some knowledge and experience about
the resilience of a system, uncertainty about this resilience
to specific stresses or extreme events and conditions will
often exist.
The salience of information generated by scenario-based
assessments depends on the match that is achieved with the
scope, dynamics and uncertainties intrinsic to the frame of
the actor, who is situated in a specific decision context (see
Fig. 5). Scenario assessments extend the uncertainties that
can be considered in a decision problem, whether this is
climate uncertainty, socio-economic uncertainty or a
combination of both. The framing of future uncertainties
implicit in the scenario approach (whether a deterministic,
exploratory or back-casting approach, for instance) will
also define which uncertainties are included in an assess-
ment. By choosing a scenario, the actor is therefore making
a choice about which uncertainties are relevant or tractable
to a given decision problem, and implicitly also a decision
about which uncertainties are not. Part of the resistance to
top-down scenarios is the feeling that the ‘framing in’ and
the ‘framing out’ of uncertainties have been taken out of
the hands of the decision-maker. Through interactive and
tailoring processes, these choices are placed back into the
hands of the decision-maker.
We may also see that the use of scenario-based assess-
ments takes place in two steps. In the first—analytical—
step, the aim will be to extend the uncertainties that are
included in the problem framing and analysis. In a sec-
ond—action—step, the aim will be to reduce the uncer-
tainties again in order to be able to come to an adaptation
action or strategy. Many of the uncertainties available
through the scenario-based assessment will now be set
aside. This too is a choice. Making a decision, including a
decision to defer, involves the re-simplification of the
decision problem by taking account only of significant
uncertainties. A scenario-based assessment offers a menu
of new and plausible uncertainties, but the decision-maker
must choose to what extent these new uncertainties are
fitted to the decision problem.
Conclusion: matching futures scenarios to the decision-
making process
Analysis and decision-making under uncertainty can be
strengthened by broadening the scope of uncertainties
considered by using scenario tools. Different ways of
representing climate change and risks need to be matched
to actor frames and decision contexts. Such matching will
not be achieved by working only on increasing the power
of climate models in order to generate increasingly better
downscaled climate information for users (cf. Lenton
2011). But nor can it be achieved by ‘bracketing out’ cli-
mate model outputs and focusing exclusively on the resil-
ience and vulnerability of socio-technical systems at the
local scale. Neither approach is capable of yielding the
range of information and insight that decision-makers need
and are able to handle.
In this paper, we have discussed different scenario
approaches and decision contexts illustrated using a wide
range of examples, varying from the classical, formal top-
down approach of the IPCC process to locally specific,
stakeholder-driven bottom-up analysis of vulnerability to
compounding events. The examples discussed in the paper
are summarised in Table 2. The collection illustrates the
myriad of frames, scenario approaches and perceived roles
of uncertainty.
To put the various frames and decision contexts into a
general framework, we propose mapping the scenarios onto
two dimensions (Fig. 6). The first dimension spans the
spatial or institutional scale: from local to the national/
global scale. The local scale refers, for instance, to regional
vulnerable hot spots in a country, a specific sector, or an
investment decision for maintaining local infrastructure.
The scale of a decision context will determine the degree of
spatial or temporal specificity relevant to the frame of the
decision-maker. The second dimension varies across the
range of conceptualisation: from top-down, generalised
scenario techniques on one end of the range to incident-
driven, tailor-made, bottom-up scenarios on the other. Each
decision context can be matched with a particular scenario
tool. These analyses are typically case-specific, and the
mapping of relevant drivers and their coincidence require
strong involvement of local experts and experience. Such
assessments will need to combine and integrate uncer-
tainties across a variety of both bio-physical and
Fig. 5 Matching uncertainties in scenarios to actor framing of
uncertainties
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institutional or cultural factors in determining the vulner-
ability or resilience of a given system.
We have mapped the illustrative examples used in the
paper in Fig. 6 and assessed them against the framing of
uncertainty in each case in Table 2. Local vulnerability
issues arising from specific historic incidents (such as a
near-flooding in northern Netherlands in January 2012) can
be found in the lower left corner of the Figure. In the top
right, national water safety design is based on a formalised,
top-down construction of scenarios (Haasnoot and Mid-
delkoop 2012) involving a combination of general socio-
economic trends and downscaled climate model outputs. It
is worth remembering that these top-down assessments are
usually initialised as a response to an extreme event which
demonstrates the need to reconsider the resilience or vul-
nerability of a system. The Dutch ‘Delta Plan’ and the
adaptation of coastal defences saw their inception after the
major coastal flooding in 1953 and were updated after
extreme river discharge levels in 1993 and 1995. A con-
ventional top-down scenario framework is being developed
for the new Delta Commission programmes (e.g. Brugg-
eman et al. 2011), providing boundary conditions to a
range of regional hot spot analyses, which are approached
via a bottom-up analysis.
Fig. 6 Scenario approaches and their application
Table 2 Examples used in this paper, the applied scenario approach and the description of how was dealt with frames and (perceptions of)
uncertainty
Examples How frames are addressed Type of scenarios
applied
Framing of uncertainty in
scenarios
Ref. to fig. 6
IPCC RCP scenarios
(scenarios 2.0) and
Shared
Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs)
Aiming at multi-stakeholder,
complex long-term decision
contexts
Top-down inventory
of socio-economic
scenarios compiled
by research
community
Limited range of climate forcings
considered, leaving room for
multiple socio-economic
narratives
Upper right corner
Dutch climate
scenarios
(KNMI’06)
Aiming at multi-stakeholder
adaptation contexts; baseline for
tailor-made (bottom-up)
scenarios
Top-down inventory
of relevant regional
climate variables
Collection of scenarios
constructed to illustrate range of
possible futures, but perceived
as full uncertainty range by
some stakeholders
Upper right corner,
with tailor-made
scenarios to lower
half of plane
Dutch delta
scenarios
Started from research community,
stakeholder participation
increased during development
process; general framework for
locally specific adaptation
decisions
Top-down inventory
of relevant regional
climate and socio-
economic variables
Uncertainty range at local scale
extends beyond dimensions
covered by delta scenarios
Scenario framework:
upper right corner;
local and national
interpretations: rest
of plane
Dutch wind energy
sector
Started as scientific study, but
stakeholder involvement led to
updated user-demanded study
Study of reliability
of tools used to
generate scenarios
For stakeholder: uncertainty about
model bias less important than
uncertainty about wind yield
trends
Starting in upper right
corner, moving to
upper left corner
North Netherlands
compound events
Bottom-up vulnerability approach,
awareness triggered by weather
event
Incident-driven
scenarios applied
Uncertainty about return
frequency of specific case is
dominant motivator for study
Lower left corner
Revised
hydrological
standard year
Bottom-up vulnerability to
extremes, mapped at national
scale
Incident driven,
adjusted to climate
change impact
Uncertainty range limited by use
of historic reference situation
Upper left corner
Adaptation tipping
point analysis and
Thames 2100
Study
Inventory of multiple boundary
conditions relevant for decision
context
Bottom-up
vulnerability
assessment of local
sector
Uncertainty about climate
variability only one of potential
drivers behind changing
vulnerability
Upper left corner
Also shown is the localisation of the example in the framework illustrated in Fig. 6
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Off-diagonal examples can also be found. Building
regulations, sewage design criteria and insurance law are
decisions with a national scope, but often based on event-
driven information about risk drivers. Historic rain events,
for instance, form the basis of the design criteria of sewage
systems, energy infrastructure or drought management.
This reliance on historic incidents is often pragmatic: the
impact of major climate/socio-economic drivers on the
extremes that dominate the design criteria is often small or
difficult to detect, while the impacts of these extremes are
highly localised and difficult to generalise. An example at
the other end of the diagram is where local decisions (like
maintenance of the water management system by water
boards or local authorities) are partially based on general
scenarios. In the Netherlands, water boards need to dem-
onstrate that they are compliant with the KNMI’06 sce-
narios for the next few decades while planning and
reporting their infrastructure plans.
Are scientific developments in the area of scenario
construction going in the right direction? With continuing
investments in climate modelling and climate services,
understanding of climate change will grow, producing
improvements in the understanding of weather and climate
dynamics at global and decadal scales, as well as local and
seasonal scales. On the other hand, major uncertainties in
climate projections over the medium and long term will
persist. An increasing focus on seasonal and decadal
forecasting for shorter-term projections holds promise, but
the useful skill of these projections remains low (Van
Oldenborgh et al. 2012). Parallel developments in
improving methods and reducing the costs of incident-
driven vulnerability assessments are also vital, and likely to
generate improvements in the modelling of event sequen-
ces, in assessments of losses and gains and in cost-benefit
assessment for adaptation options and pathways (Leonard
et al. 2013; World Bank 2010). This will include the dif-
ficult question of how to deal with deep uncertainty about
high consequence–low probability events. Here too, there
is still much ground to be won. Highly diverse actor frames
and decision-making contexts are a social fact. In all these
cases, climate change impacts, vulnerability and resilience
will be an outcome of complex interactions between bio-
physical and socio-technical factors. Innovations in climate
and socio-economic scenarios are most likely when they
take the diverse frames of stakeholders seriously and offer
a means of engaging with them.
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